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Abstract 
Companies can under IAS 40 choose between the fair value model and the cost model. The fair 
value model arguably result in more relevant information for investors but the model is also 
likely to be more costly to use. Based on prior studies suggesting that financial reports are a 
more important medium for communication with investors in companies with dispersed 
ownership than in companies with concentrated ownership (e.g., Ball et al., 2005; Givoly et 
al., 2010), we hypothesize that the use of the fair value model is positively associated with 
ownership dispersion. We study a sample with 110 publicly traded European real estate 
companies and our results show that the likelihood that a company is using the cost model is 
increasing with ownership concentration. In particular, companies in which the largest owner 
owns more than the half of the shares are significantly more likely to use the cost model. 
 
Keywords: IAS 40; fair value; accounting method choice 
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1. Introduction 
Prior research suggests that financial reports play a more prominent role in communications 
with investors and other stakeholders if a company has dispersed ownership. The reason for 
this is that although companies can communicate privately with investors on a needs-basis if 
there are few owners, it is more efficient to communicate with a large number of investors via 
financial reports (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). Our study differs from previous studies in that 
we focus on two specific accounting choices. In contrast, earlier studies have mainly used 
accruals-based measurements of earnings quality in tests of the theory (e.g., Ball et al., 2005; 
Wang, 2006; Kim and Yi, 2006; Givoli, Hayn and Katz, 2010).  
In our study we focus on companies from the real estate sector and on two choices that 
arguably increase the relevance or reliability of information conveyed to investors via financial 
reports, namely reporting fair values on the balance sheet and using an external valuer to 
measure fair values. These choices are intended to capture the importance of financial reports 
as a means of communication with investors. The use of an independent valuer arguably 
reduces information asymmetries between the company and outside investors. For example, 
Muller and Riedl, (2002) find that market makers perceive information asymmetry across 
traders to be lower when firms use independent valuers to assess the fair values of investment 
properties. Under IAS 40, companies can choose between the fair value model and cost model 
for investment property. The fair value model here implies that fair values are reported on the 
balance sheet and that unrealized changes in fair values are reported in the income statement. 
Although the association is not straightforward, the fair value model is likely to provide 
investors with more relevant information. Research suggests that fair values are value relevant 
and reduce information asymmetry between the company and outside investors (e.g., Carroll 
et al., 2003; Muller, Riedl and Sellhorn, 2011). A drawback with fair values is that they are 
open to manipulation (Bernston, 2006; Fiechter and Meyer, 2011). 
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In balance, the arguments above suggests that fair values are more relevant than cost 
However, the choice of using the fair value model and is likely to be associated with higher 
costs. One reason for this is that fair values have to be estimated every time interim or annual 
financial statements are prepared if the fair value model is used. If the cost model is used, fair 
values are only reported in the notes once a year. Furthermore, as information in the notes to 
the financial statements typically receives less attention than information reported on the 
balance sheet. Thus, based on this relevance/reliability and cost trade-off, we predict that 
companies with dispersed ownership are more likely to use the fair value model. 
We use a sample of 110 listed real estate companies operating in the European Union to 
study these predictions. The real estate industry is a suitable setting for the study of these 
predictions, partly because IAS 40 allows for alternative accounting models and partly because 
fair values of investment properties are typically based on unobservable input variables. Fair 
values in the real estate industry have also been described as subjective (Danbolt and Rees, 
2008). Thus, signalling the credibility of fair values to investors is critically important. 
 We use shareholder information taken from the Orbis database, as our main measure of 
ownership concentration. The sample is characterized by a relatively high ownership 
concentration: 30.36 % of the companies have a shareholder that directly or indirectly controls 
more than 50 % of the shares of the company, 33.93 % of the companies have an owner that 
controls between 25 % and 50 % of the shares, and for the remaining 35.71 % the largest owner 
controls less than 25 % of the shares. The high average ownership concentration, together with 
the distribution over different ownership structures, makes the sample suitable for the study of 
the effects of ownership dispersion. The mean (median) book value of total assets is €1,405 
(408) million.  
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The study makes the following contributions. Most importantly, we find a strong positive 
and significant association between ownership dispersion and the choice of the fair value 
model. Fair values are arguably relevant for investors, so these results are consistent with the 
notion that financial reports have a more prominent role in the communication with investors 
when ownership is dispersed. Thus, this finding is also consistent with the view that financial 
statements have a more prominent role in communication with investors in companies with 
dispersed ownership. Compared with prior studies, the contribution of this study is that we 
focus on the association between ownership structure and accounting choices; aspects that have 
previously not received attention in the literature. In contrast, earlier studies have used accruals 
based measures in tests of associations between ownership and properties of earnings (e.g., 
Ball et al., 2005; Wang, 2006; Kim et al., 2006; Givoli et al., 2010).  
The study proceeds as follows. Section 2 includes an overview of the rules regulating the 
accounting of investment property under IAS/IFRS. Section 3 presents prior related literature 
and the study’s hypotheses. Section 4 presents the research design, and section 5 includes the 
main results of the study. Section 6 presents the conclusions. 
 
2. Accounting for investment property under IAS 40 
This study focuses on accounting by listed real estate companies in the EU, and the 
IAS/IFRS standards as adopted by the European Commission, which have been obligatory in 
the preparation of consolidated financial statements in the EU Member States since 2005. The 
IAS/IFRS standards are also used in a large number of other countries, including Australia, 
Brazil and Canada. Furthermore, some other countries, such as China, use national standards 
that are substantially converged with IAS/IFRS. 
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The standard IAS 40 regulates the accounting of investment property and defines it as 
land, buildings or parts of buildings held by an owner to earn rental and capital appreciation 
rather than for production, administrative purposes, or sales in the ordinary course of business 
(IAS 40.5). After the initial recognition, IAS 40.30 allows a company to choose the fair value 
model or the cost model as its accounting policy. If the fair value model is chosen, it is applied 
to all the company’s investment property (IAS 40.33) and the company shall recognize gains 
or losses from changes in fair value in terms of profit or loss for the period in which these arise 
(IAS 40.35), what is more, it shall not be depreciated. If the cost method is applied, investment 
property is depreciated over its useful life. Furthermore, an impairment loss is recognized if 
the carrying value is higher than the recoverable amount (see IAS 36). Companies choosing 
this alternative have to report fair values in the notes to the financial statements (IAS 40.79e).  
This study investigates a sample from the year 2009. Up to the beginning of 2013 
guidance on fair value calculations could be found in IAS 40.45-46.1 Fair value is defined in 
IAS 40.36 as “the price at which the property could be exchanged between knowledgeable, 
willing parties in an arm’s length transaction”. This is expected to reflect market conditions at 
the end of the reporting period. According to IAS 40.45, the best evidence of fair value is given 
by current prices in an active market for similar property in the same location and condition. 
However, if the prices in an active market for similar property in the same location and 
condition are not available, the following apply: (i) prices of property of a different nature or 
from a different location, (ii) recent prices of similar properties in less active markets, or (iii) 
discounted cash flow projections based on reliable estimates of future cash flows can be used 
to assess the fair values (IAS 40.46).  
 
                                                            
1 For annual periods beginning on or after 1st January 2013, the fair value guidance in IFRS 13 is followed. 
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3. Prior literature and hypothesis development 
This paper is related to literature about accounting in the real estate sector, as well as 
literature on the association between ownership structure and earnings quality. Relatively few 
studies have focused on factors that drive accounting choices and disclosures in the real estate 
sector.  
3.1. Ownership structure and the effect on accounting choice 
  
In this paragraph we analyse how ownership structure affects accounting choice and 
disclosures from different points of view. Firstly, we examine the differential of recognition 
vs. disclosure information; secondly, the accounting choices and next, we focus on earnings in 
different ways (explanatory power and quality). 
With respect to the first point, some authors point out that the information has a different 
usefulness if it is recognised or disclosed. Johnson (1992) studied the issue showing the 
difference between disclosure and recognition in the FASB Statements. For some, no 
difference exists ((Dhaliwal, 1986; Davis-Friday et al. 1999), but for others these appear in 
terms of value relevance (Ahmed et al. 2006) and contracting costs (Espahbodi et al. 2002). 
Schipper (2007) considers that existing disclosure requirements have been developed without 
the benefit of guidance that would be provided by either some theory or a standard setter’s 
conceptual framework. Analyses of existing standards suggest that standard setter derive 
requirements for disclosures from a context-specific consideration of judgments and decisions 
that users of financial reports might make. 
One stream of the literature suggests that recognized information is more reliable than disclosed 
information (Davis -Friday et al. 2004; Libby et al. 2006), although some state that this is due 
to information-processing-related factors (Barth et al. 2003; Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003), 
among others: lack competence to understand disclosure (Dearmna and Shields, 2005) or for 
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subjective biases unrelated to user competence (Koonce et al, 2005; Hobson and Kachelmeier, 
2005). In general, it has been argued that users understand better the information given in the 
income statement that the one provided in the notes (Maines and Mc Daniel 2000; Hirst and 
Hopkins, 1998; Hirst et al. 2004).  
Some others factors may also contribute to the disclosures information content. Depoers (2000) 
signals size (Aboody, 2004), foreign activity and proprietary costs; Owusu-Ansah (1998) 
mentions company size, ownership structure, age and multinational affiliation; and Macikja 
and Patton (2004) remark the investment fund ownership. 
The accounting choice has been studied in two cases: the FIFO-LIFO selection and the pension 
plans. As for the first one, Niehaus (1989) says that has been influenced by ownership structure, 
in the sense that LIFO is negatively related to managerial ownership and also, higher outside 
ownership concentration increase the likelihood of choosing LIFO. Abdel-Khalik (1985) also 
studied this choice from the perspective of managers and how the change from one method to 
the other has effects on compensation. As for the second one, Yu (2013) examines whether the 
institutional ownership and analyst following affect the value relevance of disclosed vs. 
recognized pension liabilities, the results consistently confirm off-balance sheet pension 
liabilities are more value relevant for firms with a higher level of institutional ownership. 
The relationship between quality of earnings and ownership composition has been investigated 
from different perspectives . Lamn-Temant et al. (1984) establish a link between ownership 
control, earnings, size and how management insurers provide incentives to exercise income 
increasing or decreasing accounting choices; Dempsey et al. (1993) provide strong support for 
income increasing behaviour by non owner managers; Carlson et al. (1997) suggest that 
ownership differences, managers’ incentive structures and firm profitability are important in 
explaining smoothing behaviour in firms; Astami and Tower (2005) state that lower ownership 
concentration is positively related to pursuing income-increasing accounting techniques and in 
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the same line Ball and Shrakimar (2005) conclude that high quality earnings increase with 
ownership dispersion. From an international point of view, Leuz et al. (2006) demonstrate that 
cross-listed companies show more earnings management, less timely recognition and lower 
value relevance that the US firms. 
Closely related to the forme issue, other authors have compared the different behaviour 
between public and private entities, Hope et al. (2013) attributes the differences according to 
the type of firm: in the public ones managers have incentives to provide information demanded 
(agency theory) meanwhile for the second ones the demand is less obvious as major capital 
providers often have access to inside information and typically take a more active role in 
management (Chen et al. 2011). This implies that financial reporting in private firms are more 
likely to be influenced by factors as tax reporting, or dividend policy (Fan and Won, 2002; Ball 
and Shrakimar, 2005; Burgstahler et al. 2006; Ding et al. 2007; Ramalingegowda et al. 2013), 
in contrast with public firms that should attend the demands of external parities which stimulate 
to manipulate earnings (Graham et al. 2005). Other authors, like Givoly et al. (2010), reinforce 
the opportunistic behaviour hypothesis as it dominates the actions of managers in publicly 
traded companies and conclude that investors and other stakeholders of public firms demand 
higher quality financial information. Likewise, Burghstaler et.al. (2006) conclude that privately 
held firms have relatively concentrated ownership structures and hence, can efficiently 
communicate among shareholders via private channels, but in the case of private entities they 
have fewer incentives to report informative earnings, which implies that managers put different 
roles for reported information, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) maintain that these other uses 
render earnings less informative.  
In the same line, Leuz (2006) also states that firms with concentrated ownership and high 
differences between cash flow rights and control rights have loss incentives for financial 
reporting and Kinnuen et al. (2000) are more specific, as they conclude that foreign investors 
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may demand more information than domestic investors due to the lack of institutional 
knowledge. 
 3.1 Prior studies of the real estate sector 
Muller et al., (2011) investigated whether the adoption of IAS 40 in Europe in 2005 and 
its fair value disclosure requirements reduced information asymmetry across market 
participants. The evidence suggests that the mandatory reporting of fair values reduces, but not 
necessarily eliminates, information asymmetry differences across firms. Our study differs from 
the ones above in that we take one step forward and focus on factors associated with the practice 
to disclose information that reduce information asymmetry across market participants. 
Our study is also related to Quagli and Avallone, (2010), who studied the choice between 
cost and fair value on a sample of 76 European real estate companies in the years following the 
adoption of IFRS. They based their hypotheses on contractual efficiency related arguments, 
and the notion that fair values can reduce information asymmetry and that the choice could be 
driven by managerial opportunism. They found that the size of the company and market-to-
book calculated on accounting numbers before the adoption of IAS/IFRS were negatively 
associated with the use of fair values. Our study differs from this one in the following important 
ways. First, we focus on other factors that could drive the choice between the methods. Second, 
we use a larger sample from a more recent time period. An advantage with using a more recent 
sample is that it mitigates the impact of national pre-IFRS practices on the reporting to some 
extent.  
Kvaal and Nobes, (2012) found that although pre-IFRS patterns continued for several 
years after the adoption, some post-transition changes had also taken place. However, in 
supplementary analyses we exclude companies from the UK, where a fair value model 
resembling that under IAS 40 was used prior to IAS/IFRS adoption. 
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3.2 Hypothesis development 
We base our hypothesis on the notion in Ball et al., (2005) that the demand for high 
quality earnings increases with ownership dispersion. Ball et al use a setting with private and 
public ownership as the starting point for the analysis, and suggest that private companies are 
more likely than public companies to communicate privately with shareholders and other 
stakeholders. Private communication is comparatively less efficient for publicly held 
companies, because they often have a large number of anonymous shareholders. Furthermore, 
shareholders take a more active role in management in privately traded companies, which 
reduces their reliance on financial statements for monitoring managers. These arguments are 
transferable to a setting with high or low ownership concentration: in a setting with high 
concentration managers can communicate directly with key owners and furthermore, owners 
with a large stake in the company have incentives to monitor managers closely (cf. Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986).  
Our hypothesis focuses on the association between ownership structure and the choice 
between the cost model and the fair value model. Prior literature suggests that fair values are 
more relevant for investors than historical cost (e.g., So and Smith, 2009). Some studies show 
that recognized amounts are more relevant for investors than information disclosed in notes to 
the financial statements (e.g., Davis-Friday, Folami, Liu and Mittelstaedt, 1999; Hirst, Hopkins 
and Wahlen, 2004). This would suggest that fair values recognized on the balance sheet are 
more relevant for investors than those disclosed in notes. However, the fact that markets for 
investment properties are thin, and therefore influenced by judgment and earnings, 
management attempts may reduce the relevance of fair values. Danbolt et al., (2008) compare 
the value relevance of fair values in the real estate sector with fair values in the investment 
fund industry. They conclude that fair values in the real estate industry are considerably less 
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value relevant, and point to this as consistent with earnings management. Givoly et al., (2010) 
point out that a competing hypothesis to the demand hypothesis proposed by Ball et al., (2005) 
is that managers of companies with dispersed ownership opportunistically manage earnings in 
order to obtain private benefits. However, auditing as well as managers’ incentives to establish 
track records for credible reporting is likely to reduce incentives to manage earnings (e.g., 
Palepu, Healy and Peek, 2010 pp. 520-521).  
A factor that reduces the incentive to use the fair value model is that it is likely to be 
more costly to apply than the cost model. One reason for this is that fair values have to be 
estimated more frequently than under the cost model, because the fair values of investment 
properties are disclosed in interim reports in addition to the annual reports. Furthermore, as 
information in the notes to the financial statements typically receives less attention than 
information reported on the balance sheet (e.g., Davis-Friday et al., 1999; Hirst et al., 2004), 
one could surmise that on average companies spend more time and resources on the fair value 
measurement if the fair value model is used. Thus, if companies trade-off these benefits and 
costs with the use of the fair value model, and if financial statements have a more prominent 
role in the communication with investors and other stakeholders in a company with dispersed 
ownership, we get the following prediction: 
H1: Companies with concentrated ownership are more likely to choose the cost value 
model. 
 
4. Data and research design 
4.1 Sample 
Our study is based on a sample of 110 publicly traded real estate companies within the 
European Union. The companies in the sample operate mainly in the EU region and are all 
listed at stock exchanges in EU countries. The data used in this study was obtained from the 
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Orbis database and from the consolidated financial statements of the companies. The 
consolidated financial reports were retrieved from the companies’ websites and the following 
variables used in this study were collected: information about whether the company used the 
cost or the fair value model, the information about the biggest owners, and information about 
the method used to measure fair values.  
The data is from 2009. Companies in the European Union started to follow IFRS in 2005 
and by 2009 had been able to exploit the flexibility of IFRS and adopt accounting policies that 
were in the best interest of the company (Kvaal et al., 2012). Also, in 2009 the financial crisis 
in European countries had not had a drastic effect on the operations in the sector.2 Furthermore, 
the choice of the year studied is not likely to have any significant effects on the results because 
companies are expected to apply the same accounting policy from one period to the next unless 
a change in accounting policy is required by an IFRS or the accounting policy change results 
in financial statements providing reliably and more relevant information about the effects of 
transactions on the entity’s financial statements (IAS 8.14-15). 
The sample was composed as follows. We started with all publicly traded companies in 
the Orbis database reporting real estate activities (NACE code 68) as their main activities in 
the European Union. This gave us a primary sample of 223 companies. For some of the 
companies investment property only constituted a small proportion of their assets. For inclusion 
in the sample we required that investment property should amount to more than half of the total 
property plant and equipment. Furthermore, as we collected complementary data from the 
financial statements of the companies, only companies whose financial statements were 
available on their websites were considered for inclusion. The above criteria led to an omission 
of 111 companies, thereby leaving 110 companies for further analysis (two companies have 
                                                            
2 In the spring of 2012, 11 of the companies in the sample had been de-listed. 
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not announced the biggest owner information). The fair value method is used by 88 companies 
and the cost method by 22 companies. The mean (median) assets of the companies are €1,429 
(445) million, and the mean (median) revenues are € 136 (41) million. The origin of the 
companies is displayed in Table 1.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Companies have to disclose the methods and significant assumptions applied in 
determining fair values of investment properties (IAS 40.75d).3 We classified the companies 
into four categories, based on: (i) discounted cash flow predictions or other income based 
methods, (ii) prices for similar properties or (iii) a combination of the above methods in order 
to measure fair values. The fourth category includes companies that did not provide clear 
information about which method had been used. We found that 4 (3.64%) companies 
exclusively used a market comparable approach, 34 (30.91%) used discounted cash flows or 
another income based approach, 35 (31.82%) used a combination of the methods and 37 
(33.64%) did not provide clear information about which method was used. Thus, most of the 
companies in the sample used an income approach for the fair value measurement. 
 
4.2 Research design 
We used the following models to test our hypothesis: 
 FV =  + LARGEST + 2OWNERPrivate + 3OWNERBank + 4ORIGINGerman + 
5ORIGINEnglish + ORIGINFrench + 7LNREVENUES + 8LNREVENUES + 
9BIG4 + 10SOLVENCY + 
 
 
 
 
 
 

                                                            
3 This disclosure requirement was the standard during the time period studied, but has since been moved to IFRS 
13. 
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 FV =  + LARGEST25-50 + LARGEST>50 + 3OWNERPrivate + 4OWNERBank + 
5ORIGINGerman + 6ORIGINEnglish + ORIGINFrench + 8LNREVENUES + 
9LNREVENUES + 10BIG4 + 11SOLVENCY + 
 FV =  + 13LARGEST + 3OWNERPrivate + 4OWNERBank + 5ORIGINGerman +                  
6ORIGINEnglish + ORIGINFrench + 8LNREVENUES + 9LNREVENUES + 
10BIG4 + 11SOLVENCY + 
FV =  + 13LARGEST>50  + 1OWNERPrivate + 2OWNERBank + 3ORIGINGerman + 
4ORIGINEnglish + ORIGINFrench + 6LNREVENUES + 7LNREVENUES + 
8BIG4 + 9SOLVENCY + 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
   
We use binary logistic regressions to estimate Models 1 to 4. The ownership structure is 
measured with the indicator variables LARGEST in Model 1 and 3LARGEST in Model 3. 
LARGEST is the fraction of shares owned by the shareholder with the largest ownership in the 
company. 3LARGEST is the sum of the ownership of the three largest shareholders. In Models 
2 and 4 the ownership structure is measured with indicator variables. In Model 2, the ownership 
is measures with LARGEST25-50 and LARGEST>50. The former variable takes the value one if 
the fraction owned by the owner with the largest stake in the company is between 25 % and 50 
%, and the latter variable takes the value one if the fraction owned is over 50 %. Companies in 
which the largest shareholder owns less than 25 % are in the base-category. In Model 4, the 
ownership is based on the sum of the three largest owners, and consequently, 3LARGEST>50 
takes the value one if the three largest shareholders own more than 50 % of the shares.4 
The motivations of the control variables are as follows. Based on the data in Orbis, the 
companies were classified into the following three categories, based on the identity of the 
                                                            
4 All companies in which the three largest shareholders owned less than 25 % of the shares used the cost model. 
Thus, it is not possible to estimate a logistic regression with two indicator variables as in Model 2 
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largest owner: (i) companies owned by banks or other financial companies (e.g., a fund, an 
insurance company or a treasure holding company), (ii) companies owned by a person or 
family, and (iii) another category including companies owned by an industrial company, a 
foundation and cases where no information about the identity of the largest owner was 
available. In order to control for the possible effects of the type of owner on the results, we 
include OWNERprivate and OWNERbank in the regressions. Companies in the category (iii) are in 
the comparison category.  
According to the LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, (1998) measure, the 
countries included in the sample have different legal and enforcement qualities. Burgstahler et 
al., (2006) find that earnings quality is positively associated with the legal and enforcement 
quality. We include indicator variables for German, English and French origin as controls 
(ORIGINGerman, ORIGINEnglish, ORIGINFrench). Companies from Scandinavian origin countries, 
according to the LaPorta et al., (1998) classification, are in the reference group (Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden). Kvaal et al., (2012) suggest that national pre-IFRS patterns also have an 
impact on accounting after the adoption of IFRS. Studies also suggest that cultural factors 
influence accounting estimates (e.g., Shulz and Lopez, 2001). In addition, the legal origin 
indicator variables provide at least a partial control for these factors. 
Furthermore, one would expect larger companies to provide higher quality accounting 
and disclosures due to their public exposure. We include the logarithm of sales as a control for 
this (LNREVENUES). Growing companies are more likely to need external financing, and 
some previous studies show that the cost of capital is negatively associated with disclosure 
quality (Botosan, 1997). We include growth in sales as a control in the regressions 
(LNREVENUES). Furhtermore, Quagli et al., (2010) found that leverage is negatively 
associated with the choice of the fair value model. We use SOLVENCY as the measure. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
17 
 
Prior studies suggest that large international audit firms conduct higher quality audits 
than smaller audit firms (see Francis, 2004 for a review). A possible consequence of this is that 
the disclosure quality is higher. We include a Big 4 indicator variable as a control (BIG 4). The 
exact calculations of the variables are presented in Table 2. 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Choice between fair value and cost model 
In Table 3 we present descriptive statistics on the variables. It can be seen that the mean 
value of LARGEST is 37.49 % among fair value appliers and 55.77 % among cost model 
appliers. The corresponding figures are 53.21 % and 76.46 % when ownership concentration 
is measured with 3LARGEST. Thus, the results show that ownership is more concentrated in 
companies using the cost model (p-values < 0.01). Furthermore, the average value of 
LARGEST>50 is 0.295 for fair value model users and 0.545 for cost model users showing that 
29.5 % of the companies in the sample using the fair value model has an owner that controls 
more than 50 % of the shares. The corresponding percentage for companies applying the cost 
model is 54.5 %. The proportion of companies using the fair value model with an owner that 
controls more than 25 % and less than 50 % is 33.0 %. The corresponding percentage is 40.9 
% for the companies using the cost model. A final figure in Table 3 showing that ownership 
concentration is associated with the accounting method choice is that 3LARGEST>50 is 
significantly higher for cost model users than for fair value model users (95.5 % compared with 
60.2 %).  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
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In Table 4 we present logistic regression results of the association between ownership 
structure variables, control variables and the choice between the fair value and cost models. 
The significance levels are based on robust standard errors clustered by country.  
The results reported in the first and third regression in Table 4 show that LARGEST and 
3LARGEST have negative and significant coefficients. Thus, also the logit results show that 
companies with higher ownership concentration are more likely to choose the cost model. 
Furthermore, the negative coefficients of LARGEST>50 in Model 2 and 3LARGEST>50 in Model 
4 show, that companies in which the largest owner(s) controls more than 50% of the shares are 
significantly less likely to use the fair value model. The coefficient of LARGEST25-50 in Model 
2 is insignificant, showing that companies in which the largest owner controls between 25 % 
and 50 % of the shares are not less likely to use the fair value model than companies in which 
the largest owner controls less than 25 % of the shares. In sum, also the logistic regression 
results strongly indicate that companies with dispersed ownership are less likely to use the cost 
model, which supports our hypothesis. 
Indeed, in the motivation of hypothesis we point out that companies are more likely to 
choose the cost model when ownership is concentrated, because financial reports then have a 
smaller role in the communication with investors. In other words, the demand for higher quality 
financial reports in companies with concentrated ownership does not drive the results. 
However, fair values are arguably easier to manipulate than historical cost. Thus, an alternative 
explanation to the results is that companies with dispersed ownership are largely manager-
controlled. Managers might prefer fair value over cost in order to improve their possibilities to 
behave opportunistically and manage earnings, for example, in order to maximize bonuses (cf. 
Givoly et al., 2010). We are not able to separate between these explanations of the results. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
19 
 
Control variables: A further observation that can be made from Table 4 is that the 
identity of the largest owner is significantly associated with the choice. OWNERTYPEbank has 
a positive coefficient significant at the 0.01 level showing that companies largely owned by a 
bank or other financial company are more likely to apply the fair value model than companies 
owned by owners in the “other” category. Furthermore, it can be seen that the coefficient of 
OWNERTYPEbank is higher than the coefficient of OWNERTYPEprivate, and a chi-squre test shows 
that the difference is significant at the 0.10 level in Models 1 and 3. A possible reason for this 
is that banks want to get updated information about the fair value of collateral used as security 
for loans. If the fair value model is used, the fair values of properties are readily available in 
the balance sheet. If the cost model is used, the fair values have to be found from the notes 
what is sometimes tricky. 
Moreover, there are significant countrywide variations in the use of the fair value model. 
Companies from Scandinavian origin countries are in the reference category in the analyses. 
Thus, the results show that companies from French origin countries are more likely to use the 
cost model than companies from Scandinavian origin countries. We use chi-square tests to test 
the differences between the origin indicators. These results show that companies from English 
origin countries are significantly more likely to use the fair value model than companies from 
German or French origin countries but the difference in the coefficient estimates of 
ORIGINGerman and ORIGINFrench are generally insignificant. A possible reason why French 
origin companies are using the fair value model is that there is a strong pre-IFRS cost tradition 
in these countries. 
Furthermore, the result that LNREVENUES has a positive coefficient significant at the 
0.05-0.10 level, which shows that larger companies are more likely to use the fair value model. 
A possible reason for the more extensive use of the fair value model is that they believe that 
the typically better performance ratios of the fair value model will have a positive impact on 
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access to and the price of external funds. Finally, it can be seen that companies audited by BIG4 
audit firms are more likely to use the cost model. 
 
5.2 Supplementary analysis 
We concluded above that most companies from the UK use the fair value model. In the 
UK SSAP 19, Accounting for Investment Properties, was used prior to the adoption of IAS. 
Under this standard investment properties were re-valued on an annual basis (see e.g., Danbolt 
et al., 2008), and reported on the balance sheet. Thus, one possible contributory factor to the 
use of the fair value model in the UK is that pre-IFRS practices have had an impact on the 
choice of model under IAS 40. Thus, the frequent use of the fair value model in the UK is 
consistent with the view that accounting practices in the country before IFRS had an impact on 
post-IFRS practices (Kvaal et al., 2012). We attempted to exclude the English origin companies 
run logit regression comparable to the ones in Table 4. These results were qualitatively similar 
to the ones in Table 4: LARGEST has a negative coefficient significant at the 0.05 level in 
Model 1. In Model 2, LARGEST>50 has a negative coefficient significant at the 0.10 level while 
LARGEST25-50 is insignificant as in Table 4. Furthermore, in Model 3, 3LARGEST has negative 
coefficient significant at the 0.01 level and in Model 4, 3LARGEST>50 has a negative coefficient 
significant at the 0.05 level. In conclusion, the results show that the negative association 
between ownership concentration and the use of the fair value model is not driven by 
companies from English origin countries. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Prior studies suggest that financial reports are a more important medium for 
communication with investors in companies with dispersed ownership than for companies with 
concentrated ownership (e.g., Ball et al., 2005; Givoly et al., 2010). IAS 40 permits companies 
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to choose between the cost model and the fair value model and we study how the choice 
correlates with the ownership structure.  Based on the notion that fair value on the one hand is 
more relevant and reduce information asymmetry problems between the company and outside 
investors, but on the other hand a more costly method to apply, we predict that companies with 
dispersed ownership are more likely to use the fair value model. The prediction is tested on a 
sample with 110 listed European companies from the real estate sector, and we find strong 
support for the prediction that ownership concentration is associated with the choice between 
the methods. This is to our knowledge the first study of how ownership concentration is 
associated with the accounting method choice under IAS 40. 
A further noteworthy finding in the study is that there is considerable cross-country 
variation in the use of the fair value and cost models. We used the legal origin classification 
used by LaPorta et al., (1998) and others as the basis for our classification of countries and 
found that companies from Scandinavian origin and English origin countries were much more 
likely to use the fair value method than companies from German or French origin countries. 
One possible reason for this is that accounting practices in the countries before IAS adoption 
had some impact on post-adoption practices (e.g., Shulz et al., 2001; Kvaal et al., 2012).  
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Table 1. Breakdown of companies by accounting method and country 
 
Country Fair value model Cost model Total 
UK 22 1 23 
Ireland 1 0 1 
Belgium 5 1 6 
France 16 10 26 
Greece 3 0 3 
Italy 2 2 4 
Netherlands 1 0 1 
Spain 0 4 4 
Austria 3 0 3 
Germany 12 3 15 
Denmark 6 0 6 
Finland 3 1 4 
Sweden 14 0 14 
Total 88 22 110 
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Table 2. Variable definitions 
 
FV 
An indicator variable taking the value one if the company uses the fair value 
model and zero if it uses the cost model under IAS 40. 
LARGEST A variable measuring the ownership portion of the biggest owner. 
LARGEST>50  An indicator variable taking the value one if the largest shareholder directly or 
indirectly controls over 50% of the shares. 
LARGEST25-50  An indicator variable taking the value one if the largest shareholder directly or 
indirectly controls between 25-50% of the shares. 
LARGEST<25  An indicator variable taking the value one if the largest shareholder directly or 
indirectly controls less than 25% of the shares. 
3LARGEST A variable measuring the ownership portion of three largest shareholders. 
3LARGEST>50  An indicator variable taking the value one if three largest shareholders directly 
or indirectly control over 50% of the shares. 
3LARGEST<50  An indicator variable taking the value one if three largest shareholders directly 
or indirectly control less than 50% of the shares. 
OWNERTYPEbank 
An owner is classified as a financial company (for example a fund, an insurance 
company, a treasure holding company) or a bank. 
OWNERTYPEprivate An owner is an individual person or a family. 
OWNERTYPEother 
An owner is classified as an industrial company, a foundation or if it has been 
pointed out in Orbis that it is a public company or alternatively, the ownership 
structure was not available from Orbis (one company). 
ORIGINScandinavia 
An indicator variable taking the value one if the company is from a Scandinavian 
origin country (Denmark, Finland or Sweden). 
ORIGINGerman 
An indicator variable taking the value one if the company is from a German origin 
country (Germany or Austria). 
ORIGINEnglish 
An indicator variable taking the value one if the company is from an English 
origin country (UK or Ireland). 
ORIGINFrench 
An indicator variable taking the value one if the company is from a French origin 
country (Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Greece, Italy, Spain). 
LNREVENUES The natural logarithm of the revenues. 
LNREVENUES 
The natural logarithm of the revenues year t less the natural logarithm of revenues 
in year t-1. 
SOLVENCY The solvency of the company calculated as shareholders equity to total assets. 
BIG4 
An indicator variable taking the value one if the company is audited by PwC, 
KPMG, Ernst&Young or Deloitte. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics  
 
                     Fair value model Cost model 
 Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. P-value
LARGEST 0.375 0.273 0.558 0.216 0.002
LARGEST<25 0.375 0.487 0.045 0.212 
LARGEST25-50 0.330 0.472 0.409 0.503 
LARGEST>50 0.295 0.459 0.545 0.510 0.008
3LARGEST 0.532 0.289 0.765 0.180 0.005
3LARGEST<50 0.398 0.492 0.045 0.212  
3LARGEST>50 0.602 0.492 0.955 0.213 0.002
ORIGINScandinavia 0.270 0.446 0.043 0.209 
ORIGINGerman 0.169 0.376 0.174 0.388 
ORIGINEnglish 0.258 0.440 0.043 0.209 
ORIGINFrench 0.303 0.462 0.739 0.449 0.001
OWNERFinancial 0.539 0.501 0.304 0.470 
OWNERPrivate 0.169 0.376 0.130 0.344 
OWNEROther 0.292 0.457 0.565 0.507 0.083
LNREVENUES 10.414 1.934 10.261 2.552 0.757
ΔLNREVENUES 0.201 0.589 -0.200 0.730 0.008
BIG4 0.573 0.497 0.696 0.470 0.381
SOLVENCY 36.903 20.377 36.004 30,389 0.868
N 88 22  
 
Note: P-values are for t-tests and chi-square tests for the continuous and dichotomous 
variables respectively. The variables are explained in Table 2.
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Table 4. Logistic regression results 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
  Coef. Std.Err. P-value Coef. Std.Err. P-value Coef. Std.Err. P-value Coef. Std.Err. P-value 
LARGEST -0.020 0.086 0.019**          
LARGEST25-50    -1.283 1.102 0.876   
LARGEST>50    -1.860 0.753 0.014**   
3LARGEST     -0.048 0.012 0.000***   
3LARGEST>50       -2.008 0.927 0.030** 
OWNERTYPEprivate -0.691 1.214 0.569 -0.812 1.263 0.520 0.968 0.465 -0.154 0.965 0.873 
OWNERTYPEbank    1.272 0.450 0.005**
* 
1.294 0.401 0.001*** 2.131 0.003*** 1.177 0.343 0.001**
* 
ORIGINGerman                      -1.478 1.127 0.190 -1.630 1.265 0.198    -1.873 1.013 0.065* 
ORIGINEnglish                    0.170 1.197 0.887 0.278 1.314 0.832    -0.082 0.989 0.934 
ORIGINFrench   -2.801 1.047 0.007**
* 
-2.763 1.098 0.012**    -2.740 0.911 0.003**
* 
LNREVENUES 0.227 0.117 0.052* 0.245 0.114 0.032** 0.213 0.118 0.072* 0.317 0.166 0.055* 
ΔLNREVENUES 1.850 1.616 0.252 1.614 1.543 0.296 4.039 1.811 0.026** 1.710 1.632 0.295 
BIG4 -1.410 0.568 0.013** -1.503 0.529 0.005*** -0.753 0.488 0.123 -1.473 0.522 0.005**
* 
SOLVENCY -0.003 0.135 0.801 -0.003 0.130 0.831 0.008 0.019 0.660 -0.001 0.011 0.914 
CONS 2.347 1.378 0.089 2.603 1.644 0.113 2.146 1.714 0.211 2.121 1.679 0.206 
N 110  110  92 110   
Model Chi-square  
(p-value) 
 370.44 0.000**
* 
0.000 719.35 0.000*** 129.52 0.000*** 221.56  0.000**
* 
Pseudo R2 0.322  0.329  0.380 0.332   
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Notes: *, **, *** denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are used. The variables are defined 
in Table 2.  
